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"No Irish Need Apply"? Veto Players and Legislative Productivity in the Republic of Ireland, 1949-2000

¹ University of Florida
² University of Southern Mississippi

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: rconley{at}polisci.ufl.edu.

	Abstract

This analysis fills an important lacuna in comparative legislative studies by testing the veto players theory against a newly constructed data set of significant domestic policy legislation passed in the Republic of Ireland between 1949 and 2000. Distinguishing between single-party majority, coalition, and minority governments, the analysis places into sharp relief the ways in which the unique context of Irish political parties and institutional dynamics conflict with the basic tenets of the veto players framework.The results underscore the contextual constraints on applicability of the theory.

First published on August 4, 2009, doi:10.1177/0010414009341726

Comparative Political Studies 2010;43:91.

A more recent version of this article appeared on January 1, 2010


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